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Toward Credible Conflict of Interest Policies in Clinical
Psychiatry
January 01, 2009 | DSM-5 [1]By Point: Lisa Cosgrove, PhD [2], Harold J. Bursztajn, MD Counterpoint:
David J. Kupfer, MD [3], and Darrel A. Regier, MD, MPH [4]
 A recent letter to the American Psychiatric Association (APA) from Sen Chuck Grassley about the
APA’s financial relationship with pharmaceutical companies raises concerns about undue industry
influence.1 By instituting a disclosure policy for DSM-V, the APA took a halting first step in restoring
public trust in the most influential text on psychiatric taxonomy in the world. Unfortunately, the
APA’s efforts at creating a conflict of interest (COI) policy have failed to ensure that the process for
revising diagnostic and therapeutic guidelines is one that the public can trust. The need for more
safeguards was evidenced when the APA reported that of the 27 task force members of DSM-V, only
8 reported no industry relationships.2 The fact that 70% of the task force members have reported
direct industry ties—an increase of almost 14% over the percentage of DSM-IV task force members
who had industy ties—shows that disclosure policies alone, especially those that rely on an honor
system, are not enough and that more specific safeguards are needed. 
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A recent letter to the American Psychiatric Association (APA) from Sen Chuck Grassley about the
APA’s financial relationship with pharmaceutical companies raises concerns about undue industry
influence.1 By instituting a disclosure policy for DSM-V, the APA took a halting first step in restoring
public trust in the most influential text on psychiatric taxonomy in the world. Unfortunately, the
APA’s efforts at creating a conflict of interest (COI) policy have failed to ensure that the process for
revising diagnostic and therapeutic guidelines is one that the public can trust. The need for more
safeguards was evidenced when the APA reported that of the 27 task force members of DSM-V, only
8 reported no industry relationships.2 The fact that 70% of the task force members have reported
direct industry ties—an increase of almost 14% over the percentage of DSM-IV task force members
who had industy ties—shows that disclosure policies alone, especially those that rely on an honor
system, are not enough and that more specific safeguards are needed.
At first blush, it might appear that there is less reason for concern about industry influence on the
development of guidelines on diagnosis than on treatment. But diagnosis informs treatment
decisions. Hence, pharmaceutical companies have a vested interest in the structure and content of 
DSM, and in how the symptomatology is revised. Even small changes in symptom cri-teria can have
a significant impact on what new (or off-label) medications may be prescribed. Public trust in the
independence of clinical psychiatry is undermined if former DSM panel members are using—or are
perceived as using—their participation on DSM to leverage lucrative consulting arrangements with
the pharmaceutical industry or to funnel industry funding to their departments, associates, and
programs (eg, exerting their influence on prescription practices through public speaking
arrangements, such as industry-sponsored CME symposia).3
We need to remember that, as Louis Pasteur said, “serendipity favors the prepared mind.” That is, to
the extent that DSM is constructed as a reliable diagnostic taxonomy that emphasizes relatively
short-term, acontextual symptoms that tend to be insensitive to characterological variability in
expression, it encourages overuse of diagnostic checklists. Among other things, diagnostic checklists
provide the basis for outcome measures in clinical trials conducted by industry-funded researchers.4
These researchers then maintain that the “evidence-based research” speaks for itself, that the
disorder has been validated, and that the new drugs and medical devices have been proven to treat
the disorders effectively and safely.
Diagnostic checklists thus become established as good science and contribute legitimacy to the
proliferation of new diagnoses and new medications. Therefore, although checklists can facilitate
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diagnostic reliability, too often they become self-serving industry tools and lead to inflated statistics
about how many people are “suffering” from a disorder.5 They also make it more difficult for
researchers and clinicians to consider context and individual variability. The end result of a
diagnostic manual with acceptable reliability but limited validity is that it allows pharmaceutical
companies to bring what has been referred to as “me-too” drugs to market—medications that are
just different enough from existing pharmaceutical agents that they can be patent-protected. Many
existing and “new” agents can be helpful in the short-term for symptomatic relief but also have
increasing risks of adverse effects with long-term use, leading to a decreasing benefitto-risk ratio as
time goes on. The relative neglect of psychodynamically informed narrative descriptions in DSM has
led to it being of limited use in serving as a guide for psychodynamically informed treatment
approaches whose benefit-to-risk ratio increases over time.6,7
Clearly, if the APA is to continue to be entrusted with the task of creating unbiased diagnostic
systems and treatment guidelines, it must refocus attention on the issue of diagnostic validity and
move beyond its current exclusive self-monitoring practice. To best ensure that psychiatric
guidelines are objective and evidence-based, we offer the following recommendations:
1. In May 2008, the APA began the process of restoring credibility by naming all of the DSM panel
members and making public all of the disclosures from work group members. Unfortunately, there
are still work groups with a majority of members who have disclosed industry relationships. We
recommend that the APA review the composition of these newly identified work groups and institute
a policy that ensures that no panel has a majority of members with ties to the pharmaceutical
industry. Also, a feasible and practical way to ensure balance and avoid undue influence is to have
critics of industry actively recruited to be on the various panels.
 
2. In addition to disclosing direct financial relationships (eg, consultancies, honoraria), individuals
should be required to disclose indirect support. These include support received by one’s institution in
the form of pooled funds for academic departments, hospitals, and medi-cal schools. Unrestricted
research grants (eg, the ties of associated principal investigators on joint research projects or family
members who have received industry support) should be revealed.
 
3. Despite a requirement to disclose potential COIs, many individuals fail to do so—as researchers
and investigative journalists have demonstrated. The threshold of disclosure should be consistent
with the current standard for informed consent.8 Specifically, the industry ties and financial benefits
that must be disclosed are those that a reasonable patient would want to know rather than what
professionals generally tell their patients. (If a reasonable patient being treated according to an APA
treatment guideline wants to know about an industry tie, then the individual should disclose this
information. Such information should be disclosed even if most professionals or colleagues do not
consider such a tie to be a COI.)
Transparency of potential COIs is critical for the conduct of psychiatric teaching, research, and
clinical care. To restore public trust and protect patients’ welfare, the field must require more than
the mere reporting of blatant COIs. We need to expand the scope for disclosure, develop 
patient-centered policies, and eventually have diagnostic and treatment guidelines produced by an
organization that is not beholden to industry funding.
 
COUNTERPOINT
David J. Kupfer, MD and Darrel A. Regier, MD, MPH
Drs Cosgrove and Bursztajn are critical of COI policies for individuals involved in the development of 
DSM-V. We share the desire for a transparent process and an unbiased DSM-V. Our goal is an
evidence-based DSM-V manual that is useful to clinicians and patients.
However, in alleging bias in this process, Drs Cosgrove and Bursztajn reflect biases of their own that
should not go unchallenged.
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The first is the assumption that something has been proved to be wrong, or will be proved to be
wrong, about financial relationships between the APA and the pharmaceutical industry. Sen Grassley
requested financial data related to these relationships from a number of medical specialty societies,
including the APA. There was no accusation of wrongdoing. The APA responded fully to the senator’s
request and has received no feedback from him. The pharmaceutical industry contributes no funds
for the development of DSM-V. In fact, most APA revenue received from the pharmaceutical industry
is for advertising in journals or newsletters such as Psychiatric News. Many publications, including 
Psychiatric Times, receive significant advertising revenue without any assumption of bias.
Second, the authors claim that the public has lost trust in DSM because pharmaceutical industry ties
of members of the DSM-IV Task Force in the late 1980s and early 1990s inappropriately influenced
the validity of the diagnostic criteria. In an earlier article by Dr Cosgrove,3 she and her colleagues
retrospectively investigated disclosures made by DSM-IV Task Force members after the publication
of DSM-IV—such as industry support for research, consultations, or CME presentations. Without
offering any supporting evidence, the authors then asserted that such links prove that the reputation
of DSM-IV was damaged. This is a classic “guilt by association” logical and ethical fallacy.
Third, the authors assume that the public sees all connections between academic psychiatry and the
pharmaceutical industry as inappropriate. They seem not to appreciate or understand how the
collaborative relationships among government, academia, and industry are vital to the current and
future development of pharmacological treatments for mental disorders.
The pharmaceutical industry operates in a highly competitive market, but it is also a regulated
industry that has seen changes in the regulatory processes to address emerging problems. However,
for those whose ideological beliefs about mental disorders do not include a role for medication and
who reduce the emergence of explicit diagnostic criteria with DSM-III to nothing more than a
checklist “that allows pharmaceutical companies to bring ‘me-too’ drugs to market,” there is little
possibility that any change in DSM-V will be satisfactory.
The authors lament “the relative neglect of psychodynamically in-formed narrative descriptions in 
DSM.” Although the hope was that research could test and confirm the value of these descriptions,
the authors’ references to their own publications on the efficacy of psychodynamic treatment are not
comparable to the massive evidence for the efficacy of other psychotherapies, such as CBT and IPT,
and pharmacological treatments that have been facilitated by the DSM framework.6,7
In the recommendations section of their letter, the authors start with the unproven assertion that the
APA and DSM have lost credibility and the mistaken assumption that the public disclosure of
members of the DSM-V Task Force was an attempt to restore credibility. The authors failed to
recognize that at the time DSM-IV was developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was no
policy for public disclosure of financial interests in any journal, publication, or annual meeting—all of
these policy changes occurred after 1994. The disclosure policy for DSM-V follows current disclosure
standards, with added limitations developed by the APA Board of Trustees on the total amount of
industry funding that a participant can receive. Public posting of the members’ disclosures was a
voluntary effort by the APA to demonstrate its commitment to and agreement with the need to limit
potential industry bias in the development of DSM-V.
Given the authors’ now well-documented antimedication and anti-industry bias, it is clear that they
would prefer to have no one on the DSM-V Task Force or Work Groups with any connection to
industry. However, we believe that careful attention to potential conflicts of interest, including those
of individuals committed to a single school of psychotherapeutic intervention or approach, will inform
diagnostic revisions with a broad scientific base that has been greatly enlarged and facilitated by the
definitions of mental disorders provided since the release of DSM-III. This includes geneticists who
are looking closely at the future feasibility of having genetically informed, specific pharmacological
treatments for treatment-resistant depression in the same manner that such genetically informed
pharmacological treatments are now available for certain forms of breast cancer. In one of their
references, the authors note approvingly of our published interest in considering more dimensional,
developmental, and culturally sensitive expressions of mental disorders in DSM-V.7
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We invite Drs Cosgrove and Bursztajn and the readers of Psychiatric Times to monitor the most
inclusive and transparent developmental process in the 60-year history of DSM at our Web site—and
to submit any additional recommendations for the process or content of this collaborative scientific
effort.
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